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Abstract
We specify a principal-agent marketing channel involving producers, wholesalers, retailers and
a futures market. Our hedge ratio for producers appears to be much lower than the common
price-risk minimising ones as we account for producers’ vertical contracts and, by using
annual data, their production horizon. The Dutch ware potato marketing channel and its futures
market in Amsterdam show that possibly through decreases in producers’ and wholesalers’
risk aversions, their optimal dynamic hedge ratios decreased from 38% and 12%, respectively,
in 1982 to 18% and 10%, respectively, in 2003. These results comply with the decreased
futures volume traded in Amsterdam over the years.
Keywords: Principal-Agent Model; Risk Management; Futures and Spot Market Contracts,
Production Horizons; Food Marketing Channels
1. Introduction
Risk is prevalent in commodity marketing channels (e.g. Knoeber and Thurman, 1995).
Marketing channel members (MCMs) can manage their risk by hedging in a futures market. A
futures contract (futures for short) is a standardised agreement traded on an organised
exchange (the futures market) to deliver a specific amount of a commodity at a specified future
time, price and place. A primary use of futures involves shifting risk from a firm that desires
less risk (the hedger) to a party who is willing to accept the risk in exchange for an expected
profit (the speculator). Speculators are not always spot-market traders and therefore, futures
positions are often offset prior to expiration. For example, crop producers can protect
themselves from declines in prices of expected outputs by selling futures contracts at the
beginning of the growing period and buying back futures at the time their product is ready to
be sold in the spot market. As futures and spot prices are positively correlated, losses and gains
in the two markets tend to offset each other, leaving the hedger with a return close to what was
expected (e.g. Ederington, 1979).342   Risk Management Using Futures Contracts: The Impact of Spot Market Contracts and Production Horizons...
Output variability reduces the risk reduction capacity of hedging for crop growers, however,
making it advisable for them to sell futures up to a quantity less than the expected harvest (e.g.
Moschini and Lapan, 1995). Moreover, although futures and spot prices tend to move in
parallel, these movements are not usually identical; this results in basis risk (where basis is
defined as the local spot price minus the futures price). As can be demonstrated by the
minimum-variance criterion, this is also why the common price-risk minimising hedge ratio
(hedge ratio is defined as the futures position in kg divided by the spot position in kg) can be
less than 1. Consequently, for crop producers and all other traders wishing to reduce risk by
hedging with futures contracts, the hedge ratio is of critical importance (e.g. Dawson et al.,
2000).
Previous studies on time-varying hedge ratios use high-frequency data (i.e. daily and weekly
data), and neglect the contractual relationships in the spot marketing channel (e.g. Pennings
and Meulenberg, 1997). In contrast, high-frequency data such as daily or hourly observations
are rarely considered by crop producers when they have to decide about their production
scheme. Supply models with adaptive expectations (e.g. Nerlove, 1958 and Askari and
Cummings, 1977) have shown that crop producers base such decisions on an average of prices
over a number of years, rather than on the price quotation of a single trading day. Furthermore,
vertical contractual relationships between the MCMs determine how much risk each MCM
bear (e.g. Pennings and Wansink, 2004) and hence, each risk-averse MCM's optimal hedge
ratio. Principal-agent theory is a widely used economic approach towards modeling these
contractual relationships (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Consequently, in this paper we use
the classic model in agency theory to derive the optimal hedge ratios. We do not only use
annual data that conforms to the producers’ decision horizon, but also take the contractual
relationships in the spot marketing channel into account. 
For this purpose we specify a three-stage principal-agent marketing channel model involving
producers, wholesalers, retailers and a futures market, where risk-averse producers and
wholesalers trade futures in order to manage their risks. The rest of the paper is structured as
follows. We present the model in Section 2. The empirical application and results are presented
in Section 3. Finally, conclusion and discussion are presented in Section 4.  
2. The Theoretical Model
In our model, we consider a product that is produced by farmers, processed and distributed to
retailers by processors/wholesalers (wholesalers for short) and finally sold to consumers by
retailers. The retail value of the product (i.e. at consumer prices) is specified as ,
where x is the actual retail value, e = E(x) is the (common knowledge) expectation of the retail
value, and   is the random component of the retail value, which is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean zero (i.e. E(ε) = 0) and variance . We assume a hypothetical linear
contract between the retailers and the wholesalers as follows:  , where   is the
total compensation payment from the retailers to the wholesalers,   is the incentive
parameter,   is the variable compensation payment, and   is the fixed compensation.
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Similarly, the contractual relationship between the wholesalers and the producers is specified
as  , where   is the total compensation payment from the wholesalers to the
producers,   is the variable-revenue sharing parameter between the wholesalers and the
producers (i.e. the proportion of the wholesalers’ variable revenue that is received by the
producers),   is the actual incentive parameter from the wholesalers to the producers, and
and  are the variable and fixed compensation payments to the producers,
respectively.
The wholesalers’ and producers’ expected cost of effort are specified as
and , respectively, where   and   denote trend terms that may reflect
technological changes in production, and   and   are the increases in the marginal costs.
Net of fixed retail costs, the retailers’ profit is   with variance 
 as can be seen from the expressions above. Since the product is one of the many
stock-keeping units in each retailer’s assortment, we assume that the retailers do not care about
this variance. In contrast, in the model, we allow the risk-averse producers and wholesalers to
trade futures besides their contractual relationships in the marketing channel, to hedge against
the risks incurred in the product’s spot market. Accordingly, the producers profit  , resulting
from selling futures of their produce and the contractual relationship with the wholesalers, is
given by  , where   represents the producers’
gain or loss from selling futures, in which   is the quantity of produce sold in the futures
market at time t−1 and bought back at time t;  is the futures price at time t−1; and  is the
futures price at time t. Thus, the producers’ result of holding a hedging position can be either
positive or negative, depending on whether the futures price at maturity when the position is
closed is below or above the price at which the position was initiated. The difference in the
futures price between time t−1 and t is assumed to follow a random walk with drift as follows:
, where  , denoting the drift term, reflects storage and interest costs,
and   is the error term with zero mean and variance . In the same vein, the wholesalers’
net result from their long hedge and the contractual relationship with the retailers is given
as , where   represents the wholesaler’s
gain or loss from buying futures, in which   is the quantity of produce bought at time t−1 and
sold at time t. Similarly, the wholesaler’s result of holding a hedging position can also be either
positive or negative, depending on whether the futures price at maturity is below or above the
futures price at which the position was initiated.
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Producers and wholesalers do not only form expectations regarding their respective profits,
they are also aware of the uncertainty in these expectations. We use the variance in producers’
and wholesalers’ profits as a proxy for their risk. The variance of the producers’ profit is
 , where  denotes the covariance between
and . Similarly, the variance of the wholesalers’ profit appears to be 
. Given that the risk aversions of producers and
wholesalers comply with the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preference and that their
profits are normally distributed, then their objective functions are equivalent to the
maximisation of their respective certainty equivalents of profits 
(i.e. the profits with risk that yield an identical level of satisfaction as the profits with no risk),
where  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
The producers’ objective function is then as follows: 
, of which the first-order conditions are 
(also known as the incentive constraint) and    .
Having defined the objective function of the producers, it is important to elaborate on the
constraints in the contract between the producers (i.e. the agent) and the wholesalers (i.e. the
principal). In the contract with the producers, the wholesalers are not only subjected to the
incentive compatibility constraint, but also to the participation constraint. The participation
constraint asserts that the producers equate their reservation wage   (i.e. the wage they can
obtain without risk in an alternative job) to their certainty equivalent of profit. From this
constraint and the two first-order conditions the producers’ fixed compensation   is then
derived as 
Having derived the conditions for the parameters in the contract offered by the wholesalers to
the producers, we now turn to the derivation of the optimality conditions for the parameters in
the contract offered by the retailers to the wholesalers. From the expressions above we can
derive that the wholesalers maximise the certainty equivalent of profit as follows: 
to obtain the two first-order conditions 
and
, where . Like the producers, the
wholesalers consider a participation constraint, according to which the certainty equivalent of
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the wholesalers’ profit, , equals the wholesalers’ reservation wage,  . From this
condition, and after inserting the first-order condition for , the wholesalers’ fixed
compensation is derived as 
We now turn to the objective function of the risk-neutral retailers. They maximises their
expectation of profits as follows: 
   for which the first-order condition yields 
. Recall from the linear contract between
the retailers (i.e. the principal) and wholesalers (i.e. the agent) that the revenue-sharing
parameter is given by αw. In the contract for the producers the revenue-sharing parameter is
αpαw. Consequently, if αp is a constant parameter, then both revenue-sharing parameters may
still be time varying through αw. In line with this notion and for purpose of empirical testing to
be discussed in the next section, we consider αw, βw, βp, ρw, ρp, Zw and Zp as unknown
variables, which can be solved by the equations above. In this respect it is of interest to discuss
the derivation of the solutions for ρw and ρp below.
If we substitute the expression for  in the expression for   we obtain the following
expression for the producers’ revenue-sharing parameter  in their contracts with the
wholesalers: . Rewriting this expression yields
the following equation for the producers’ risk parameter: 
. Next, substituting this expression for  and the rewritten
incentive constraint   into the first-order condition of the expected profit
maximisation problem of the retailers solved above, we obtain the wholesaler’s risk parameter
as follows: . Subsequently, substituting
this expression for  in the last expression for  we derived, we obtain for the risk parameter
of the producers:    .
These risk parameters are one of the determinants of the producers’ and wholesalers’ hedge
ratios. In the model, we assume that the quantity produced q is the same as the quantity
consumed. The optimal hedge ratios for the producers and wholesalers, respectively, are given
by  and , where   and   are as defined above and 
denotes the expected output. 
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3. Empirical Application: Data, Estimation and Results
We apply our model to the Dutch ware potato industry. Every year, some eight million tons of
ware potatoes are produced in the Netherlands, mainly on family farms. Most ware potatoes
are sold to wholesalers and most of the wholesale trade has become concentrated in relatively
few hands, as the major users, particularly the large retailers, processors and export markets,
demand large quantities with tight specifications which only the larger wholesalers can meet.
Because of this development in the market, the need has arisen to procure potatoes before
harvest. In this respect, the potato futures contract of the Euronext Amsterdam Commodity
Exchange fulfills a price discovery role (see Kuiper et al., 2002). 
For the empirical analysis, Statistics Netherlands provided us with annual data over the period
1971 – 2003, for the following variables: the farm, export (i.e., wholesale) and retail prices
(Euro/kg) of ware potatoes, all deflated by the consumer price index (1990 = 1.00) to obtain
ppt, pwt and pt, respectively, area planted (1000 ha), yield per hectare (100 kg/ha), and rent
price of land (Euro/ha), deflated by the consumer price index. Furthermore, we obtained the
futures price of potato and the volume of potato futures contras traded at Euronext Amsterdam
Commodity Exchange over the period 1971-2003. We used the futures price (Euro/kg) for
delivery in April of year t quoted as the closing price of the first trading day of April in year t −
1 to represent Ft,t ; to represent Ft,t−1, we used the futures price (Euro/kg) for delivery in April
of year t + 1  quoted as the closing price of the first trading day of November (when most
potatoes are sold by the farmers) in year t. Both Ft,t−1 and Ft,t are also deflated by the consumer
price index. From these time series, we obtain the following variables of interest. First, all
prices, spot and futures, are deflated by the consumer price index. The output quantity qt
(million tons) in year t is computed as the yield per hectare times the area planted. Then, using
the deflated prices, we construct xt = ptqt, Wwt = pwtqt and Wwt = pptqt. We compute the
conditional expectation of pt by the fit of a regression of pt on a constant and Ft,t−1 and denote
it as  (pt|It−1), assuming that the information set It−1 is common to all MCMs. Using data on
yield per hectare and the number of hectares planted, the estimate of the expected output
E(qt|It−1), denoted as  (qt|It−1), is obtained by the product of area planted and expected yield
per hectare, where the expected yield per hectare is assumed to follow an autonomous positive
linear time trend. Next, we turn to the estimation of E(ptqt|It−1). For this, note that ptqt =
E(pt|It−1)E(qt|It−1) + E(pt|It−1)εqt + εptE(qt|It−1) + εptεqt, where εpt = pt − E(pt|It−1) and εqt = qt −
E(qt|It−1) are the unexpected components of pt and qt, respectively, and εptεqt represents the
covariance of pt and qt, which we may expect to be negative. Consequently, E(ptqt|It−1) =
E(pt|It−1)E(qt|It−1) + E(εptεqt|It−1). Now, to estimate E(ptqt|It−1) we simply regress ptqt on a
constant and  (pt|It−1)( qt|It−1). In this way,  (pt|It−1)( qt|It−1) extracts all the information
of interest out of εptεqt since the regression residuals are orthogonal to (pt|It−1)( qt|It−1).
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Hence, the fit of the regression is denoted as  (ptqt|It−1) = êt, the expected output value at
retail level. Next, the estimate of εt denoted as   is obtained by subtracting êt from ptqt. The
estimate of σε
2 (i.e. the variance of the random output value at retail level) denoted as   is
simply computed as the fit of a regression of εt
2 on a constant. The rent price of land times the
area planted (divided by 106) is used as a proxy for  (the producer’s reservation wage).
Lastly, we set   (the wholesaler’s reservation wage) equal to zero and used linear models
with a constant and linear trend to estimate dw and dp.
Note that many variables become time varying during the estimation process, as we use time-
series data. Hence the subscript t is imposed on the variables. The only constant parameters left
to be estimated are   ,   ,   ,   , and   . In order to estimate these parameters, we
derive the estimation equations as follows. First, we consider the linear contract for the
producers  and substitute   for   as obtained from the incentive
constraint and substitute for  its participation constraint solution. Some rewriting then gives
               (1)
Similarly, after substituting   for   in   and then substituting for  its
participation constraint solution, we obtain
 
             (2)
After inserting the solutions of and  and modeling the deterministic terms dp and dw as
linear trends, giving dpt = dp0 + dp1t and dwt = dw0 + dw1t, we can estimate the unknown
parameters  αp,  cp,  cw,  dp0,  dp1,  dw0, and dw1 in the two-equation system, by using Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). The FIML estimates of the unknown parameters
αp, cp, cw, dp0, dp1, dw0, and dw1 in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are 0.581, 0.261, 0.485, 0.276, −0.007,
−0.107, 0.000 respectively. The estimate for   is significant and fits nicely within the
expected constraints 0 <  < 1. The estimates of the marginal cost terms cp and cw are
positive and significant as well. For the producers we obtain a significantly negative slope of
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production. Also the estimates of   obtained by   lie within the (0,1) interval and
increase from 0.4 in 1971 to 0.6 in 2000. Consequently, producers and wholesalers face
increasing incentive intensities as given by    and  . In contrast, their fixed
compensations  and   are decreasing. Given the constant variance of the output value
 this together implies that producers and wholesalers are getting confronted with an
increasing coefficient of variation (CV) regarding their profits. Is this because they are better
able to manage their risk by extending their position in the futures market relative to their
position in the spot market, or do they rather become less risk averse (e.g. because they want to
become more market-oriented) or both? It appears that the risk-aversion parameters
and sharply decreased whereas Figures 1 and 2 show that the optimal hedge ratios have
been decreasing as well, from 12% and 38% in 1982 to 10% and 18% in 2003 for the
wholesalers and producers, respectively. Consequently, these results give rise to the conclusion
that the risk-averse MCMs in the Dutch ware potato marketing channel are more inclined to
receiving incentives (which lower the coordination costs in the marketing channel as full
incentives would imply the MCMs to be risk neutral leading to the first-best Pareto optimal
solution for the channel as a whole) not because they relatively hedge more but rather because
they have become considerably less risk averse. This conclusion can be seen as a probable
explanation of the decreases in the volume of futures contracts traded over the years in
Amsterdam. 
 Figure 1. Wholesalers’ optimal dynamic hedge ratio (HW)
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Figure 2. Producers’ optimal dynamic hedge ratio (HP)
4. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we extend the widely-known two-stage, principal-agent model to a three-stage
model involving producers, wholesalers, retailers, and a futures markets to assess risk, and
risk-management strategies in an agricultural marketing channel. The model allows risk-averse
producers and wholesalers to trade in the futures market, in combination with their respective
contract relationships in the spot markets. We derive an expression for their optimal hedge
ratios.
The empirical application to the Dutch potato marketing channel shows that as a consequence
of decreases in the producers’ and wholesalers’ degree of risk aversion during 1971-2003, the
optimal dynamic hedge ratio for wholesalers decreased from 14% in 1971 to 10% in 2003,
whereas that of producers decreased from 38% in 1982 to 18% in 2002. To validate the
model’s results, we compared the hedge ratios estimated by the model and the actual volume of
futures contracts traded in Amsterdam over time. And indeed, the decrease in the hedge ratios
of both producers and wholesalers is consistent with reality, as the volume of futures contracts
traded at Amsterdam Commodity Futures Exchange also decreased over the years. We
conjecture that the hedge ratio estimates in this paper are more consistent with channel
members’ decision framework than previous estimates, as they account for contract
relationships within the marketing channel as well as the production horizons.
Our displayed hedge ratio for the producers (see Figure 2) in 1995 and 1996 of around 0.17 is
clearly lower than the ratio reported in Pennings and Meulenberg (1997), who used weekly
observations on the basis of which they estimated an optimal hedge ratio in a mean-variance
framework for Dutch potato growers of 0.47 for 1995 and 1996. This difference complies with
the fact that their mean-variance model dealt only with price risk. And indeed, futures markets
more often offer the opportunity to hedge against price risk rather than against output value
risk, yet − as is captured by the agency model that we propose − it is the latter risk that the
producers must deal with as well.
Finally, note that our analysis has been performed on the basis of the implicit assumption of
representative MCMs. Nevertheless, there may be large differences in the performance among
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producers as well as among wholesalers and hence in their individual optimal hedge ratios.
There is therefore a clear need for further research on panel data of individual producers and
wholesalers.
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